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and nonemployment. In line with descriptive evidence, we find lower job-to-job and higher 
job-to-nonemployment transition probabilities for women than men when controlling for 
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differences vanish once we allow these characteristics to affect separations differently by 
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considerably lower and also significantly less wage-elastic for women than for men. 
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1 Introduction
In most countries, women have traditionally shown a lower attachment to the labour force
in that they have higher propensities to quit jobs and to leave employment than men.
While job separation rates dier substantially between countries, a recent comparative
analysis by the OECD (2010) makes clear that women have higher separation rates than
men in almost all OECD countries. This even holds when controlling for industry, age,
and educational attainment. It would be interesting to know, however, whether this is
still true when taking into account further individual and workplace characteristics and
when distinguishing separations to employment from those to nonemployment.
The likelihood and the determinants of a job separation of a woman compared to
a man are particularly relevant from an employer's perspective. For instance, rms may
place (particular groups of) employees with higher job separation probabilities in jobs with
lower training and/or reduced career opportunities, thus avoiding to lose human capital
investments. Statistical discrimination of this kind is likely to be one of the main sources
of the gender pay gap. While this consequence of gender dierences in job separation rates
is also relevant from the point of view of a policy-maker, she may be equally interested
to nd out whether and why women are more likely to end up in nonemployment since
this could impede future labour market prospects.
That distinguishing job-to-job from job-to-nonemployment transitions (rather than
looking at the overall separation rate) is quite important has been shown by Royalty
(1998) in an empirical analysis for the U.S.1 In particular, she nds that the gender
dierence in overall separations rates is rather low due to osetting inuences of higher
job-to-job turnover for men and higher job-to-nonemployment turnover for women.
Moreover, a recent study by Frederiksen (2008) for private sector employees in Denmark
points at the importance of including both information on individuals and workplaces
to take account of labour market segregation.2 Conrming Royalty's results, Frederiksen
nds that women are more likely to separate to nonemployment and less likely to make
job-to-job transitions, but there is no gender dierence in the overall separation rate.
Building on these insights, this paper utilises linked employer{employee data for
western Germany to investigate gender dierences in the separations rates to employment
and nonemployment. Our data allow us to improve in several ways upon Frederiksen
(2008), whose snapshot data { though comprehensive in coverage { only refer to
a specic day in November of each year and contain few workplace characteristics
(just establishment size and payroll per employee). First, our data set comprises
1 Earlier studies investigating gender dierences in overall job separation rates but not distinguishing
job separations by destination state include Viscusi (1980), Blau and Kahn (1981), as well as Light
and Ureta (1992).
2 For an empirical study investigating worker turnover utilising only workplace characteristics, see
Anderson and Meyer (1994).4
much more workplace characteristics, including workforce composition, the industrial
relations regime, and protability, as well as additional information on individuals, such
as nationality and tenure. This enables us to account more adequately for observed
heterogeneity, in particular at the level of the establishment, and to identify hitherto
neglected forces that might drive gender dierences in job separations. Second, since we
have information on the employment spell length on a daily basis, we can make use of
continuous hazard rate modelling techniques and are thus able to control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the establishment level by tting stratied Cox models. Third, this
allows us to account comprehensively for potential gender segregation eects in the labour
market reected in both observed and unobserved plant characteristics. That said, the
main limitation of our data set is that it does not contain (reliable) information on
workers' marital status and number of children.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets up our empirical specication, while
Section 3 describes our linked employer{employee data. Our results are presented and
discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Specication
To investigate gender dierences in job separations, we will employ methods of competing
risks survival analysis, i.e. we will t competing risks models.3 Standard univariate
survival analysis models the time spent in a given state before transition to another state.
This gives rise to a single hazard rate function, which is the instantaneous probability of
leaving the state at some time t conditional on survival up to t. Other than univariate
survival analysis, competing risks survival analysis allows for the possibility that subjects
may exit into more than just one destination state. The term `competing risks' is used
because the subject is confronted with exit probabilities into dierent, mutually exclusive
destination states. By modelling these dierent destination-specic hazard functions,
competing risks models serve as models of multivariate survival analysis.
More concretely, suppose there are M workers (indexed m = 1;:::;M) with N
employment spells (indexed i = 1;:::;N) who work for J rms (indexed j = 1;:::;J). An
employment spell is the period from the beginning until the end of a worker's employment
relationship within a particular rm. A worker can exit employment via two possible
routes: The worker can either change his or her employer, i.e. he or she separates to
employment (route e), or can change to nonemployment (route n). Let T r denote the
latent spell duration for exit via route r with r = e;n. T r thus gives the spell duration if
there were no other routes than r, which may cause the employment spell to end. T r is
latent because the duration of an employment spell is either censored, i.e. no exit takes
3 For details about competing risks models we refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 640{664) and
Jenkins (2005, pp. 91{112).5
place during observation, or ends with a separation to employment or nonemployment.









i refers to the duration of a censored employment spell without any exit during
the period of observation.
Let se
i(t) denote the latent instantaneous separation rate to employment at time t
and sn
i (t) the latent instantaneous separation rate to nonemployment at time t, where t
corresponds to the time elapsed since the beginning of the spell, that is the worker's tenure.
Let further si(t) denote the overall instantaneous separation rate at time t. Assuming
(conditional) independence in competing risks, i.e. latent failure times and thus route-






The overall separation rate is then the sum of the two route-specic separation rates.
Under the independence in competing risks assumption, the estimation of the competing
risks model becomes straightforward: We just have to estimate two separate hazard rate
models for the instantaneous separation rates to employment and nonemployment, where
exits via the other route are considered as censored spells.






ik(t)) denote a vector of k time-varying covariates observed for
employment spell i at time t with r = e;n. Next, let r = (r
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r
k)> denote a vector




j(i)l(t)) is a vector of l time-varying covariates observed for rm
j(i) at time t, for which the worker with spell i is working, while r = (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denotes the corresponding vector of l coecients. We model the instantaneous separation


















Equation (3) therefore denes conditional proportional hazard functions with rm-specic
baseline hazard sr
0j(i)(t) that reects unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the rm.
Put dierently, the impact of the worker's tenure on his or her instantaneous separation
rate to employment or nonemployment is allowed to be rm-specic. Leaving sr
0j(i)(t) an
unspecied nonnegative function of the worker's tenure t, we arrive at two stratied Cox
models with time-varying covariates, where Cox's (1972; 1975) partial likelihood estimator
allows us to estimate r and r conditionally on rm-specic unobserved heterogeneity6
without the need of identifying it.4 In principle, this stratied partial likelihood estimator
bears a lot of similarity to the within estimator for the linear xed eects model (cf., e.g.,
Ridder and Tunal, 1999). As stated above, the estimation of the competing risks model
is then achieved by separate estimation of these two models.
If xr
i(t) includes a (time-invariant) female dummy femi, which is one if spell i is an










fem denotes the route-specic coecient of the female dummy. Hence, expr
fem  1
gives the percentage gender dierence in the instantaneous route-specic separation rate.
3 Data
The data set used in subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, i.e. the Linked
Employer{Employee Data Set of the Institute for Employment Research (Institut f ur
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit). The LIAB is created by linking the process-produced person-
specic data of the IAB with the IAB Establishment Panel (cf. Alda et al., 2005).
Using the LIAB we are therefore able to control both for individual and workplace
characteristics.
The employee history used for constructing the LIAB is based on the integrated
notication procedure for the health, pension, and unemployment insurances.5 This
procedure requires all employers to report all relevant information on their employees
if covered by the social security system, where misreporting is legally prohibited.
Notications are compulsory both at the beginning and end of employment. Additionally,
an annual report must be made for each employee employed on 31st of December of the
year. As a consequence, only those workers, salaried employees, and trainees who are
covered by social security are included. Thus, among others, civil servants, self-employed,
those in marginal employment, students enrolled in higher education, and family workers
are not included. All in all, about 80 per cent of all people employed in western Germany
are part of the employee history.
The data include, among others things, information for every employee on the
daily gross wage, censored at the social security contribution ceiling, on the employee's
occupation and occupational status, on industry, and on the start and end of each
employee notication. Furthermore, individual characteristics, such as age, sex, schooling,
and nationality are contained. Due to notications made in the case of changes which are
4 For details about (stratied) Cox models and their estimation via partial likelihood, see Therneau
and Grambsch (2000) and Klein and Moeschberger (2003, pp. 243{328).
5 Details are given by Bender et al. (2000) and Alda et al. (2005).7
relevant according to benet entitlement rules, the data set also comprises information
on the employee's marital status and the number of children, but only in case of an
unemployment spell, and these variables contain much measurement error. Therefore, we
will not be able to use them as regressors. Finally, an establishment number is included
which is used to link the employee history and the IAB Establishment Panel.
The employer side of our data set is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a random
sample of establishments (not rms) from the comprehensive Employment Statistics
drawn according to the principle of optimal stratication.6 Strata are dened over plant
sizes and industries, where all in all ten plant sizes and 16 industries are considered and
large plants are oversampled. Since the survey is based on the Employment Statistics
aggregated via the establishment number as of 30th of June of a year, it only includes
establishments which employ at least one employee covered by social security. Every
year since 1993 the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed the same establishments from
all industries in western Germany. Response rates of units which have been interviewed
repeatedly exceed 80 per cent. The IAB Establishment Panel is created to serve the needs
of the Federal Employment Agency, so that the focus on employment-related topics is
predominant. Questions deal, among other things, with the number of employees, the
working week for full-time workers, coverage by collective agreements, the existence of a
works council, the establishment's performance, and the technological status of the plant.
Linking both the IAB Establishment Panel and the employee history through the
establishment number gives the LIAB.7 We will use version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal
model, which is based on a balanced panel of establishments participating in the IAB
Establishment Panel in each year between 2000 and 2002 and provides information on
all workers who have been employed by any of these establishments for at least one day.
For all workers we have accurate information on their employment spells. Workers who
are still employed by the same establishment at the 31st of December 2002 are treated as
censored. For those who leave their establishments between 1st of January 2000 and 31st
of December 2002, we know whether they move to another plant or whether they move to
nonemployment.8 Therefore, we are able to construct the separation rates to employment
and to nonemployment as discussed in Section 2, where employment refers to employment
at another establishment. Separations into nonemployment end either in unemployment
or are not recorded in the data anymore (`unknown'). The latter either implies that the
person has changed to nonemployment without receiving benets from the unemployment
oce or that the person has become, for instance, a self-employed not included in the
employee history. While our data set does not enable us to disaggregate this category
6 Details about the IAB Establishment Panel are given by K olling (2000).
7 For details about the dierent LIAB models and their versions, see Jacobebbinghaus (2008).
8 Note that our data set does not allow us to distinguish between voluntary quits and involuntary
dismissals. A crude approximation, which is in line with empirical evidence from other German
data sets (see, e.g., Burda and Mertens, 2001), would be that job-to-job moves are predominantly
voluntary quits, while most of the separations to nonemployment may be involuntary dismissals.8
of unknown destination, information from other data sets suggests that the majority of
employees in this category have indeed moved to nonemployment.9 Therefore, we have
pooled the separations to unemployment and the separations to `unknown' to separations
to nonemployment. We have not modelled them separately because the assumption of
independent hazards of separating to unemployment and of separating to the `unknown'
group would clearly be erroneous.
We restrict our analysis to western Germany (since the eastern Germany labour
market was still in a special transformation process in our observation period), to full-
time employees, and to establishments that employ at least ve and no more than
1,000 employees.10 This leaves us { after dropping establishments and their employees
with missing values of the covariates in any of the years { with information on
216,032 employees, 57,898 of which are women and 158,134 are men, working in 3,010
establishments. Table 1 reports that 62,109 separations take place during our period of
observation. 38,608 employees leave their establishments to join another company, while
23,501 workers exit to nonemployment. The remaining 153,923 workers are employed
by the same establishment until 31st of December 2002. It turns out that the overall
separation rate does not dier much by gender. There are marked gender dierences,
however, both in the separation rate to employment and to nonemployment. The
separation rate to employment is about 2.4 percentage points larger for men, while the
separation rate to nonemployment is about 1.9 percentage points larger for women. Hence,
the descriptive analysis conrms the osetting eect of separations to employment and
non-employment found in earlier empirical studies.
Of course, this may change once we take other individual and workplace characteristics
into account. Due to the inclusion of establishment data, we are able to control as
well for person-specic characteristics as for characteristics of the establishment the
employee is working for. In particular, by tting stratied Cox models we can control for
unobserved heterogeneity at the establishment level and thus for labour market sorting in
a comprehensive way. The sample means of the covariates are displayed in the Appendix
Table.
9 See, for example, Bartelheimer and Wieck (2005) for a transition matrix between employment and
nonemployment based on the German Socio-Economic Panel, which allows stratication of the
`unknown' into detailed categories.
10 Since there is no detailed information on the number of hours worked, we exclude employees
working part-time (at any time in the observation period). We further exclude establishments with
a workforce of less than ve and more than 1,000 employees because works councils, which cannot
be set up in establishments with a workforce of less than ve employees and which exist in virtually
all establishments with more than 1,000 employees, are found to be one important determinant
of both separations to employment and to nonemployment (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2010b). Moreover,
apprentices and a small number of employees experiencing recalls are excluded. In addition, we keep
only individuals which were on 1st of January 2000 between 16 and 55 years old, where the upper
bound should ensure that the transitions into nonemployment are not due to (early) retirement.
Finally, notications which start and end at the same day and benet notications which correspond
to employment notications at the same time are deleted.9







All 216,032 (100) 62,109 (28.8) 38,608 (17.9) 23,501 (10.9)
Female 57,898 (100) 16,430 (28.4) 9,309 (16.1) 7,121 (12.3)
Male 158,134 (100) 45,679 (28.9) 29,299 (18.5) 16,380 (10.4)
Note: The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. Only establishments with
5{1,000 employees and spells ending or beginning in 2000{2002 are considered.
A shortcoming of the LIAB is that daily gross wages, which are one of our covariates
in later specications, are censored at the social security contribution ceiling, viz. e143.95
in 2000, e146.02 in 2001, and e147.95 in 2002. This aects about 13.1 per cent of the
spells in our sample. Obviously, using wage data without any correction would give biased
estimates. However, any imputation of the censored values cannot completely remedy this
problem since it would introduce, by construction, some measurement error. And this
would cause inconsistent estimates of the impact of the wage if included as a regressor. In
a rst step, we therefore estimate the separation rates without the wage as regressor, and
when including the log wage in a second step, we carry out our analysis only for those
workers whose wages were always below the ceiling during the period of observation. This
reduces the number of spells by 16.1 per cent for men and by 5.0 per cent for women.
4 Results
To investigate gender dierences in job separation rates, we now t conditionally
independent competing risk models, where the route-specic separation rates are modelled
as (stratied) Cox models. We include several covariates to control for both observed
individual and workplace characteristics. To assess whether female workers have higher
or lower separation rates to employment and nonemployment than males, we rst of all
include a female dummy. If we think of labour markets as search markets with signicant
search frictions, we expect women to have a lower separation probability to employment.
This should reect their lower average propensity of achieving better-paying jobs via
voluntary job-to-job moves owing to domestic responsibilities, particularly when children10
are present.11 This is in line with the empirical nding of more severe search frictions
for women (e.g., Manning, 2003, pp. 44{49; Hirsch, 2010, pp. 168{173) and is likely to
be one of the driving forces behind the gender pay gap: If women engage less in job
shopping, which one source of (early-career) wage growth, they should nd it harder
to work their way up the wage distribution than men and thus achieve lower wages on
average. With respect to job-to-nonemployment transitions, we expect women to have
a higher separation rate, again mainly due to domestic responsibilities lowering their
labour market attachment, such as child care and elderly care, but also because of gender
dierences in preferences for non-market time.
Other individual characteristics controlled for are the worker's nationality (i.e., a non-
German dummy), his or her age (nine dummies), formal education (six dummies), and
occupation (ten dummies). If search frictions in the labour market are signicant, older
workers should nd themselves in better jobs on average. This simply reects their longer
search activity, giving rise to better matches on average. Accordingly, workers' age should
be negatively related to their separation rates to employment and nonemployment as both
the worker and the employer should be more reluctant to dissolve these better matches
either by voluntary quits or by involuntary dismissals. With respect to nonemployment,
however, this may hold less for workers near retirement who may also have an incentive
to leave jobs to nonemployment due to generous early-retirement options and welfare
payments for old unemployed, suggesting an inversely u-shaped relationship between the
workers' age and their transition probability into nonemployment.
Regarding education, higher degrees of formal education should reect higher
productivity both in terms of signalling productivity and of higher investments in
human capital. Since we expect workers with higher formal qualication and thus higher
productivity to face less severe search frictions, which is in line with empirical studies
investigating group-specic dierences in search frictions, such as van den Berg and Ridder
(1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and Manning (2003, pp. 44{49), their separation
rate to employment should be higher. Moreover, employers should be less inclined to
lay o these workers due to the higher match-specic rents involved, therefore reducing
the separation rate to nonemployment for more qualied individuals. Similarly, we argue
that workers in occupations requiring more skills should exhibit lower separation rates to
both employment and nonemployment, so that controlling for the worker's occupation is
important, too.
To control for observed heterogeneity in workplace characteristics, we include
several establishment covariates: First of all, the separation rates to employment and
nonemployment may dier by sector, so we include ten sectoral dummies in the non-
11 As already said in Section 3, we unfortunately do not have (reliable) information on workers' marital
status and number of children, which would allow us to investigate this conjecture in more detail.
We would expect the gender dierence mainly to show up for married women with children and a
much weaker dierence, if any at all, for childless singles.11
stratied Cox models.12 Next, the establishment's industrial relations regime should
play a role in workers' job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment transition behaviour. The
representation of workers' interests by a works council or a union via collective agreements
may, on the one hand, improve morale and reduce the separation rate to employment
via a collective-voice eect and, on the other hand, reduce the separation rate to
nonemployment by insuring employees against dismissals (as is found for works council
existence by Hirsch et al., 2010b). Hence, we add dummies for works council existence
and the existence of a collective agreement at the rm or sector level. Furthermore, the
establishment's workforce composition and its size may also be important for workers'
transition behaviour, in particular if occupational segregation plays a role. We therefore
include the proportions of female, qualied, and xed-term workers in the establishment's
workforce as well as establishment size and its square as additional covariates. Finally, the
establishment's protability and technological status may have an inuence on transition
behaviour, as well. Establishments with good economic performance and new production
technology may be more attractive employers, thus lowering the worker's separation rate
to employment. Establishments with poor economic performance, however, should be
forced lay o workers more often, so that workers in these establishments should exhibit
a higher separation rate to nonemployment.
Eventually, additional covariates capturing overall (labour) market conditions are
added: The lagged regional unemployment rate is included to take local labour market
conditions into account, while a set of year dummies is to capture potential cyclical
inuences. In the following, we shall discuss the results of our conditionally independent
competing risk models separately by route, starting with job-to-job transitions.
4.1 Separation Rate to Employment
As a baseline, we t a standard Cox model for the instantaneous separation rate to
employment including all the covariates discussed above, the results of which are shown
in the rst column of Table 2. This uses 216,032 employment spells, where 38,608 of the
spells end with a job-to-job move. We nd that women are less likely to change jobs.
Their separation rate to employment is 10.2 percentage points lower than men's, where
this gender dierence is statistically signicant at the 1 per cent level.13
Yet, this standard Cox specication does only control for observed workplace
12 The sectors distinguished are (1) agriculture, hunting, and forestry (including shing),
(2) mining, quarrying, electricity, gas, and water supply, (3) manufacturing, (4) trade and
repair, (5) construction, (6) transport, storage, and communication, (7) nancial intermediation,
(8) business activities, (9) other activities, as well as (10) non-prot organisations and public
administration.
13 Note that a plot of the Nelson{Aalen baseline hazard after the Cox regression points at an overall
negative duration dependence (see Appendix Figure A.1). This seems plausible: The longer a worker
stays in a specic match, the better should have been that match on average, and therefore the lower
should be his or her separation probability to employment.12
Table 2: Determinants of workers' instantaneous separation rate to employment
Regressors Cox model Stratied Cox
model
Fully interacted stratied Cox
model
Baseline  Female
Female (dummy) {.108 (.014) {.036 (.014) {.088 (.153) |
Non-German (dummy) {.138 (.021) {.137 (.020) {.151 (.022) .057 (.048)
Age under 21 years (ref. group) | | | |
Age 21{25 years (dummy) {.287 (.066) {.141 (.067) {.158 (.085) .051 (.136)
Age 26{30 years (dummy) {.464 (.065) {.234 (.067) {.261 (.084) .100 (.135)
Age 31{35 years (dummy) {.596 (.065) {.356 (.066) {.365 (.084) .063 (.135)
Age 36{40 years (dummy) {.712 (.065) {.491 (.067) {.475 (.084) {.051 (.135)
Age 41{45 years (dummy) {.797 (.066) {.624 (.067) {.597 (.084) {.101 (.135)
Age 46{50 years (dummy) {.902 (.066) {.737 (.067) {.705 (.084) {.118 (.136)
Age 51{55 years (dummy) {.925 (.067) {.784 (.068) {.783 (.085) .031 (.138)
Age 56{58 years (dummy) {.809 (.078) {.691 (.075) {.681 (.092) {.030 (.164)
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (ref. group) | | | |
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) {.045 (.017) .057 (.016) .033 (.018) .083 (.040)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) .288 (.051) .373 (.051) .329 (.063) .132 (.107)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) .089 (.028) .192 (.028) .167 (.034) .070 (.060)
Technical college degree (dummy) .098 (.029) .252 (.028) .220 (.030) .114 (.071)
University degree (dummy) .228 (.027) .348 (.028) .308 (.030) .156 (.064)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) | | | |
Qualied manual occupation (dummy) .029 (.018) .007 (.017) .012 (.018) {.015 (.066)
Engineers and technicians (dummy) .120 (.021) .034 (.020) .041 (.021) {.060 (.058)
Basic service occupation (dummy) .067 (.024) .021 (.024) .004 (.026) .084 (.065)
Qualied service occupation (dummy) .095 (.046) {.015 (.051) {.070 (.078) .085 (.100)
Semi-professional (dummy) {.064 (.036) .059 (.040) .080 (.051) {.040 (.072)
Professional (dummy) .186 (.042) .325 (.045) .332 (.052) {.105 (.092)
Basic business occupation (dummy) .198 (.027) .121 (.029) .147 (.036) {.074 (.058)
Qualied business occupation (dummy) .153 (.019) .047 (.020) .042 (.023) {.034 (.046)
Manager (dummy) .171 (.033) .188 (.035) .186 (.038) {.030 (.090)
Works council (dummy) {.130 (.018) {.103 (.074) {.125 (.075) .136 (.047)
Coll. agreement at sector level (dummy) {.130 (.016) {.353 (.047) {.354 (.049) {.000 (.038)
Coll. agreement at rm level (dummy) {.022 (.021) {.219 (.058) {.211 (.059) {.046 (.053)
Proportion of female workers {.219 (.030) 1.029 (.143) 1.110 (.144) {.204 (.061)
Proportion of qualied workers .128 (.023) 1.644 (.071) 1.636 (.072) {.018 (.059)
Proportion of xed-term workers .196 (.056) {1.781 (.168) {1.667 (.171) {.326 (.136)
Bad economic performance (dummy) .531 (.011) .483 (.022) .499 (.022) {.098 (.028)
New production technology (dummy) {.029 (.012) {.163 (.023) {.188 (.024) .104 (.031)
Establishment size / 1000 {.528 (.079) {.396 (.432) {.340 (.434) {.214 (.202)
Establishment size / 1000 squared 1.199 (.078) {.219 (.386) {.243 (.389) .145 (.205)
Regional unemployment rate (lagged, %) .012 (.002) {.076 (.020) {.076 (.020) .011 (.004)
Year 2000 (ref. group) | | | |
Year 2001 (dummy) .294 (.013) .190 (.030) .220 (.032) {.110 (.031)
Year 2002 (dummy) .173 (.014) .286 (.038) .333 (.039) {.165 (.033)
Ten sectoral dummies (p < :001) | | |
Observations 580,409 580,409 580,409
Spells 216,032 216,032 216,032
Transitions 38,608 38,608 38,608
Log likelihood {387,163 {126,791 {126,120
Pseudo-R2 .0096 .0170 .0176
Notes: The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. The dependent variable of the (stratied) Cox
models is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel-establishment to another
establishment and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are given in parentheses. Only
establishments with 5{1,000 employees and spells ending or beginning in 2000{2002 are considered.13
heterogeneity. We therefore expect more reliable results from a stratied Cox model
allowing the baseline hazard to be establishment-specic and estimating the covariates'
coecients without identifying the baseline, thus controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
in workplace characteristics. In particular, this allows us to account for gender segregation
eects reected in observed and unobserved establishment characteristics.
Estimating the stratied Cox model, the results of which are presented in the second
column of Table 2, we nd that female workers still have a signicantly lower separation
rate to employment than males. Although the dierence between women's and men's
separation rates of 3.5 percentage points is reduced to only about one third of the
dierence found in the standard Cox model, it is still signicant at the 1 per cent level.
This result is in line with our hypothesis that women are less inclined to make wage-
increasing voluntary job-to-job moves.
Most of the control variables included have the expected impact. Let us start with
individual characteristics. First, non-German workers have a 12.8 percentage points
lower separation rate to employment than Germans, where the dierence is statistically
signicant at the 1 per cent level. Similar to our discussion of the lower separation rate of
women, this may indicate higher search frictions for non-Germans caused, for example,
by language barriers not fully mirrored in formal education and/or discrimination, which
would be in line with previous ndings (e.g., Manning, 2003, pp. 44{49; Hirsch, 2010,
pp. 168{173). Second, older workers tend to have lower job-to-job transition rates than
young workers; and, third, there are signicant dierences according to formal education
and occupation.
Also workplace characteristics have a signicant eect on workers' job-to-job
transition probability. First, the industrial relations regime plays an important role.
The separation rate to employment is markedly lowered by a collective agreement or
a works council, though the latter eect is not signicant at conventional levels. Second,
the establishment's workforce composition has a signicant impact: While both the
proportions of female and qualied workers have a large, signicantly positive impact on
the separation probability to employment, the separation rate is inversely related to the
proportion of xed-term workers in the workforce. Third, the establishment's protability
status has a large, signicant eect on the instantaneous job separation probability to
employment, which is 62.1 percentage points larger when economic performance is bad.
Fourth, the separation rate is also lowered signicantly by new production technology.
While all these workplace characteristics turn out to be important determinants
of workers' probability of job-to-job moves, they are all absent in previous empirical
studies investigating the impact of individual and workplace characteristics on workers'
job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment transition behaviour, such as Frederiksen (2008).
Apart from the bias stemming from omitting these variables, existing studies do also not
account for unobserved factors at the establishment level likely to impact the separation14
probabilities. This is particularly important as gender segregation eects reected in
unobserved establishment characteristics may be important. We therefore argue that
our results, which are by and large consistent with earlier studies, are not only more
informative by pointing at additional factors inuencing workers' job-to-job transition
behaviour, but are also more reliable by tackling unobserved heterogeneity in workplace
characteristics.
In the stratied Cox model discussed so far, all gender dierences in covariate impacts
show up in the coecient of the female dummy. However, it would be interesting to
know whether the separation rate to employment is still lower for females when allowing
the covariates to impact men's and women's job-to-job transition behaviour dierently.
The third and fourth column of Table 2 therefore show the results for a fully interacted
stratied Cox model. While this model ts the data signicantly better according to an
(unreported) likelihood ratio test, it also points at several interesting gender dierences
in the impact of workplace characteristics on workers' job-to-job transition behaviour.
The separation probability for women is now 8.4 percentage points lower than that
for men, though the coecient of the female dummy is estimated with considerably
lower precision and thus insignicant. While individual characteristics by and large do
not impact men and women dierently, several workplace characteristics do. We nd
a signicantly negative eect of a works council on the separation rate to employment
for men, whereas it does not show up for females, which corroborates earlier ndings
by Hirsch et al. (2010b) pointing at a lower collective-voice eect for female workers.
Moreover, women's job-to-job transition probability is signicantly less aected than
men's by bad economic performance of the establishment they are working for, while the
negative eect of new production technology on workers' separation rate to employment
is less pronounced for women. Also changes in workforce composition aect women and
men dierently: There is a large, signicantly positive relationship between the proportion
of female workers in the establishment's workforce and the separation probability of both
females and males, but this eect is signicantly lower for women workers.14 Eventually, an
increase in the proportion of xed-term employees in the workforce lowers the separation
rate of women while leaving the separation probability of male workers unaltered.
Given these ndings, we conclude that there are clear gender dierences in the
impact of workplace characteristics. It is therefore of crucial importance to control in
a comprehensive way for workplace characteristics as their dierent impact by gender
may otherwise show up in the coecient of the catch-all female dummy, tempting
14 It is tempting to interpret this result as reecting gender segregation in the labour market { with less
attractive working conditions and more voluntary quits in more female-dominated establishments
and men being more likely to voluntarily move out of these establishments than women. However,
note that this interpretation is far-fetched given that the identication of the establishment
characteristics' coecients via stratied partial likelihood rests on within-establishment variation in
these characteristics (see, e.g., Ridder and Tunal, 1999).15
the researcher to draw premature conclusions. Let us now turn to the other route an
employment spell might end by investigating the separation rate to nonemployment.
4.2 Separation Rate to Nonemployment
Again, we start by tting a simple Cox model including all aforementioned covariates,
the results of which are found in the rst column of Table 3. This utilises 216,032
employments spells, where 23,501 of these spells end with a transition to nonemployment.
We nd that women are more likely to move to nonemployment. Their separation rate to
nonemployment is 20.3 percentage points larger than the transition rate of males, where
this dierence is signicant at the 1 per cent level.15
The gender dierence only slightly changes when tting a stratied Cox model
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in workplace characteristics, the results of which
are shown in the second column of Table 3. Women still have a signicantly higher job-to-
nonemployment transition probability. Their separation rate to non-employment is now
22.5 percentage points larger than men's. This is in line with our expectation that women
are more likely to move out of employment for family-related reasons.
Most of the control variables have the impact expected. Regarding individual
characteristics, we rst of all nd that non-German workers are signicantly more likely
to move to nonemployment. Their separation rate is 21.7 percentage points larger than
Germans', the dierence being signicant at the 1 per cent level. Second, with respect to
age, we get the expected inversely u-shaped relationship with prime-age workers being
least likely to move into nonemployment. Third, we nd considerable dierences according
to formal education and occupation.
The controls for workplace characteristics also aect workers' job-to-nonemployment
transition behaviour signicantly. First, the industrial relations regime is of importance
as is seen by the negative impact of a collective agreement at the sector level on the
separation rate to nonemployment. Second, the establishment's workforce composition
aects the separation rate to nonemployment: It increases with the proportion of qualied
workers in the establishment's workforce. Third, the establishment's protability status
shows the expected impact. Bad economic performance yields a 8.4 percentage points
larger job-to-nonemployment transition probability, where this eect is signicant at the
1 per cent level.
Again, in this specication, all gender dierences in the eects of the covariates are
sponged up by the catch-all female dummy. We therefore t a fully interacted stratied
15 A plot of the Nelson{Aalen baseline hazard after the Cox regression points at negative duration
dependence in the rst ten years of tenure and virtually no duration dependence afterwards (see
Appendix Figure A.2). This seems plausible insofar as more tenured workers should be less likely to
be dismissed than new entrants owing to their higher specic human capital and dismissal protection
legislation, where this eect should add less and less to employees' employment stability when
workers' tenure increases further.16
Table 3: Determinants of workers' instantaneous separation rate to non-employment
Regressors Cox model Stratied Cox
model
Fully interacted stratied Cox
model
Baseline  Female
Female (dummy) .185 (.017) .203 (.018) {.066 (.126) |
Non-German (dummy) .219 (.021) .197 (.022) .204 (.025) {.028 (.047)
Age under 21 years (ref. group) | | | |
Age 21{25 years (dummy) {.519 (.045) {.444 (.046) {.450 (.058) {.015 (.093)
Age 26{30 years (dummy) {.737 (.044) {.620 (.046) {.720 (.058) .268 (.092)
Age 31{35 years (dummy) {.869 (.044) {.743 (.046) {.855 (.057) .346 (.091)
Age 36{40 years (dummy) {1.001 (.044) {.864 (.046) {.892 (.058) .076 (.093)
Age 41{45 years (dummy) {1.068 (.045) {.924 (.047) {.900 (.059) {.124 (.095)
Age 46{50 years (dummy) {1.089 (.046) {.951 (.048) {.937 (.060) {.059 (.097)
Age 51{55 years (dummy) {.933 (.047) {.766 (.049) {.779 (.061) .023 (.100)
Age 56{58 years (dummy) {.431 (.063) {.322 (.068) {.379 (.083) .163 (.146)
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (ref. group) | | | |
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) {.329 (.019) {.285 (.021) {.310 (.024) .082 (.044)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) .643 (.049) .610 (.052) .669 (.067) {.090 (.102)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) {.338 (.038) {.314 (.040) {.348 (.053) .079 (.079)
Technical college degree (dummy) {.358 (.042) {.345 (.045) {.383 (.054) .159 (.096)
University degree (dummy) {.222 (.038) {.114 (.041) {.113 (.049) .025 (.081)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) | | | |
Qualied manual occupation (dummy) {.177 (.022) {.267 (.026) {.281 (.028) .152 (.071)
Engineers and technicians (dummy) {.567 (.033) {.491 (.036) {.493 (.040) .049 (.086)
Basic service occupation (dummy) {.169 (.025) {.147 (.031) {.125 (.034) {.026 (.065)
Qualied service occupation (dummy) {.337 (.054) {.182 (.066) {.143 (.107) .026 (.125)
Semi-professional (dummy) {.458 (.039) {.424 (.049) {.547 (.078) .258 (.093)
Professional (dummy) .059 (.051) .112 (.060) .108 (.072) .014 (.108)
Basic business occupation (dummy) {.157 (.034) {.202 (.041) {.159 (.053) {.051 (.075)
Qualied business occupation (dummy) {.354 (.025) {.400 (.030) {.470 (.037) .103 (.056)
Manager (dummy) {.248 (.046) {.116 (.050) {.111 (.056) {.092 (.115)
Works council (dummy) {.272 (.020) {.021 (.088) {.065 (.090) .138 (.050)
Coll. agreement at sector level (dummy) {.126 (.019) {.141 (.046) {.143 (.048) .007 (.046)
Coll. agreement at rm level (dummy) {.125 (.027) {.081 (.059) {.054 (.063) {.070 (.065)
Proportion of female workers .021 (.036) {.015 (.140) .153 (.143) {.399 (.080)
Proportion of qualied workers {.166 (.028) .149 (.074) .110 (.076) .128 (.069)
Proportion of xed-term workers 1.132 (.039) {.042 (.133) .011 (.136) {.230 (.091)
Bad economic performance (dummy) .360 (.016) .081 (.027) .103 (.029) {.064 (.038)
New production technology (dummy) {.076 (.015) .035 (.026) .028 (.028) .032 (.036)
Establishment size / 1000 {1.404 (.103) {1.038 (.542) {1.290 (.548) .688 (.253)
Establishment size / 1000 squared 1.087 (.110) .616 (.508) .815 (.514) {.634 (.264)
Regional unemployment rate (lagged, %) .008 (.002) {.026 (.022) {.026 (.022) {.012 (.005)
Year 2000 (ref. group) | | | |
Year 2001 (dummy) .109 (.016) .113 (.034) .069 (.036) .123 (.037)
Year 2002 (dummy) .267 (.017) .289 (.040) .252 (.042) .082 (.038)
Ten sectoral dummies (p < :001) | | |
Observations 580,409 580,409 580,409
Spells 216,032 216,032 216,032
Transitions 23,501 23,501 23,501
Log likelihood {239,745 {77,148 {77,001
Pseudo-R2 .0199 .0168 .0187
Notes: The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. The dependent variable of the (stratied)
Cox models is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel-establishment to
non-employment and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are given in parentheses. Only
establishments with 5{1,000 employees and spells ending or beginning in 2000{2002 are considered.17
Cox model to investigate whether controls impact men and women dierently, the results
of which are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 3. First of all, the female
dummy's coecient is now negative, though insignicant. Women do not have a higher
separation rate to nonemployment per se. Conrming our hypothesis that higher job-to-
nonemployment turnover of women might be primarily due to family-related reasons, we
nd that only women aged 26 to 35 years have signicantly larger separation rates to
nonemployment than men of that age, whereas younger and older women do not dier in
their separation rates from males. All in all, individual characteristics other than age do
not seem to impact women and men dierently.
Yet, some workplace characteristics do: While a works council has an insignicantly
negative eect on the separation rate to nonemployment for men and an insignicantly
positive one for women, the dierence in these eects is signicant, in line with earlier
ndings by Hirsch et al. (2010b) pointing at a less pronounced insurance eect of works
councils for women compared to men. Also changes in the establishment's workforce
composition reected in the proportions of female and xed-term employees in the
workforce aect men and women dierently.16
4.3 Including the Wage as Regressor
Lest to lose observations due to censored wage data, we have not included the worker's
wage as a regressor in the competing risk models so far. Wages, however, might be
important for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the wage is likely to be an important
determinant of workers' turnover behaviour both into employment and nonemployment.
The higher the wage paid, ceteris paribus, the lower should be the separation rate
to employment as voluntary job-to-job moves are less likely to yield a wage gain for
the worker. Moreover, a higher wage should also lower the transition probability into
nonemployment, for individuals who are paid low wages are more likely to leave the
labour market due to the availability of transfer payments or because they are more
productive in household production. Put dierently, the volume of voluntary transitions
into nonemployment should depend negatively on the wage paid.
On the other hand, there are several studies pointing at more wage-elastic turnover of
men compared to women (e.g., Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009; Hirsch et al., 2010a; Ransom
and Oaxaca, 2010). As these studies point out, gender dierences in the wage elasticity
of workers' turnover probabilities are likely to be an important source of the gender pay
gap: If women are less likely to leave their employer for pecuniary considerations { for
example, due to family-related reasons { employers may possess more wage-setting power
16 Again, one might be tempted to tell a gender segregation story explaining the gender dierence in
the eect of the proportion of female workers in the establishment's workforce on workers' separation
rate to nonemployment. But as explained in footnote 14, stratied partial likelihood estimation of
the coecients of the establishment characteristics relies on within-establishment variation, casting
serious doubts on such an interpretation.18
over their female employees and exploit this to increase their prots at the detriment of
women's wages. In short, this sort of monopsonistic or Robinsonian discrimination (due
to Robinson (1933), who was the rst to discuss it) requires women's labour supply at the
level of the plant to be considerably less elastic than men's; and all the studies mentioned
found gender dierences in turnover behaviour large enough for this to hold empirically.17
If women's transition behaviour is indeed driven less by their wages, it is also plausible to
expect women to have lower separation rates to employment and nonemployment when
controlling for the wage.18
We now redo our previous analysis by tting fully interacted stratied Cox models
for workers' instantaneous separation rates to employment and nonemployment adding
workers' log wage as another covariate, the results of which are presented in Table 4. Since
the wages contained in the LIAB are censored at the social security contribution ceiling,
we only utilise employment spells with wages always below that ceiling.19 (For the details,
see Section 3.) Hence, the following analysis uses only 187,702 employment spells, 32,548
of which end with a job-to-job move and 21,708 with a transition into nonemployment.
First of all, the competing risks model with wage as additional covariate ts the
data signicantly better as is seen by the marked increases in both route-specic log
likelihoods. Since the coecient of the log wage gives the wage elasticity of the respective
separation rate, we arm the ndings of the studies mentioned earlier: Women's transition
probabilities into employment and nonemployment are both signicantly less wage-
elastic than men's. This holds even when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in
workplace characteristics, which previous studies were not able to do. Hence, our results
are consistent with less elastic female labour supply at the plant level and point at the
potential relevance of Robinsonian discrimination as one driving force of the gender pay
gap.20 What is more, controlling for wage clearly aects the gender dierence in transition
probabilities: Women now show signicantly smaller separation rates to both employment
and nonemployment than men earning the same wage, reecting their less wage-elastic
17 For more details about Robinsonian discrimination we refer to Hirsch (2009; 2010).
18 Against this background, the negative (but due to the low precision in estimation insignicant)
coecient of the female dummy in the fully interacted stratied Cox model for the separation rate
to nonemployment may be due to possible correlation of other control variables with the omitted
wage of the worker.
19 As a check of robustness, we also estimated the following models by including a dummy for wage
censoring rather than excluding spells with censored wages, where the dummy's coecient captures
the average wage eect for wage-censored observations. The results, which are available upon request,
are armative to our ndings from the models excluding censored spells presented below.
20 At this stage, one may object that part of the wage eect found may be demand-driven, rather than
a supply-side response. However, since we control for both observed and unobserved determinants of
establishment's layo behaviour, we think this to be less of a problem. Note further that our sample
does not include plant closings because it consists of a balanced panel of establishments. Nonetheless,
we redid our analysis excluding downsizing establishments (i.e., establishments with an employment
reduction of at least 25 per cent during our period of observation) as a check of robustness. We
found that our results did not change qualitatively and are thus robust to this exercise.19
Table 4: Determinants of workers' instantaneous separation rates to employment and
non-employment when the wage is included as regressor





Baseline  Female Baseline  Female
Female (dummy) {.907 (.269) | {2.203 (.272) |
Log daily gross wage {.860 (.041) .166 (.060) {2.137 (.046) .480 (.063)
Non-German (dummy) {.177 (.024) .087 (.049) .145 (.026) .043 (.048)
Age under 21 years (ref. group) | | | |
Age 21{25 years (dummy) {.055 (.087) .035 (.138) {.198 (.073) {.112 (.105)
Age 26{30 years (dummy) {.086 (.085) .074 (.137) {.336 (.072) .137 (.103)
Age 31{35 years (dummy) {.135 (.085) .001 (.137) {.346 (.072) .101 (.103)
Age 36{40 years (dummy) {.252 (.085) {.112 (.138) {.342 (.072) {.170 (.105)
Age 41{45 years (dummy) {.374 (.086) {.150 (.138) {.378 (.073) {.308 (.107)
Age 46{50 years (dummy) {.473 (.086) {.180 (.139) {.432 (.074) {.251 (.110)
Age 51{55 years (dummy) {.511 (.087) {.085 (.141) {.289 (.076) {.192 (.112)
Age 56{58 years (dummy) {.345 (.097) {.161 (.168) .008 (.100) .003 (.163)
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (ref. group) | | | |
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) .123 (.019) .043 (.041) {.076 (.025) {.024 (.046)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) .401 (.072) .096 (.116) .580 (.084) {.020 (.119)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) .338 (.039) {.021 (.064) .032 (.059) {.028 (.085)
Technical college degree (dummy) .443 (.042) .094 (.081) .115 (.065) .120 (.106)
University degree (dummy) .652 (.044) .065 (.076) .583 (.061) {.150 (.093)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) | | | |
Qualied manual occupation (dummy) .066 (.019) {.067 (.067) {.161 (.030) .070 (.074)
Engineers and technicians (dummy) .293 (.027) {.163 (.064) .079 (.047) {.175 (.094)
Basic service occupation (dummy) {.013 (.027) .083 (.065) {.095 (.034) {.018 (.067)
Qualied service occupation (dummy) .025 (.084) .110 (.104) .029 (.114) .046 (.131)
Semi-professional (dummy) .268 (.058) {.052 (.077) {.091 (.083) .139 (.096)
Professional (dummy) .630 (.074) {.116 (.116) .616 (.092) {.006 (.127)
Basic business occupation (dummy) .270 (.043) {.110 (.063) .199 (.060) {.226 (.080)
Qualied business occupation (dummy) .199 (.028) {.078 (.050) {.077 (.041) {.014 (.061)
Manager (dummy) .612 (.066) {.142 (.123) .636 (.088) {.238 (.148)
Works council (dummy) {.039 (.083) .135 (.051) {.025 (.098) .136 (.054)
Coll. agreement at sector level (dummy) {.277 (.052) {.026 (.041) {.085 (.051) {.107 (.050)
Coll. agreement at rm level (dummy) {.193 (.063) {.031 (.056) {.045 (.070) {.084 (.069)
Proportion of female workers 1.086 (.154) {.155 (.069) .056 (.152) {.156 (.089)
Proportion of qualied workers 1.579 (.075) {.015 (.063) .144 (.082) .092 (.075)
Proportion of xed-term workers {1.512 (.175) {.269 (.142) {.156 (.141) .090 (.098)
Bad economic performance (dummy) .501 (.025) {.123 (.031) .099 (.030) {.104 (.041)
New production technology (dummy) {.209 (.026) .090 (.033) .003 (.030) .042 (.038)
Establishment size / 1000 {.246 (.467) {.225 (.219) {1.283 (.574) .541 (.275)
Establishment size / 1000 squared {.824 (.420) .213 (.224) .791 (.538) {.469 (.288)
Regional unemployment rate (lagged, %) {.050 (.021) .015 (.004) {.002 (.023) {.002 (.005)
Year 2000 (ref. group) | | | |
Year 2001 (dummy) .176 (.034) {.054 (.033) .111 (.038) .136 (.039)




Log likelihood {99,666 {67,495
Pseudo-R2 .0209 .0435
Notes: The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. The dependent variable of the (stratied)
Cox models is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel-establishment to
employment or non-employment, respectively, and zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the individual level are
given in parentheses. Only establishments with 5{1,000 employees and spells ending or beginning in 2000{2002 are
considered.20
transition behaviour.21 With respect to the other covariates, all our earlier ndings carry
over qualitatively.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated gender dierences in transition probabilities into
employment and nonemployment using a large German linked employer{employee data
set, the LIAB, and methods of competing risks survival analysis. We argued that due to
domestic responsibilities women should be less inclined to make job-to-job moves, likely
to reect wage-improving voluntary quits, whereas they should have a higher propensity
of leaving their jobs to nonemployment. We tted conditionally independent competing
risk models, where the route-specic instantaneous separation rates to employment and
nonemployment are modelled as stratied Cox models. Including a female dummy in
the hazard rate models, we corroborated these hypotheses. Insofar, our results conrm
existing studies, such as Royalty (1998) and Frederiksen (2008), stressing the osetting
gender eects of job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment transitions.
Furthermore, our analysis makes clear that both individual and workplace
characteristics aect workers' transition behaviour. This is in line with Frederiksen's
(2008) ndings based on very few workplace characteristics. Moreover, the richness of our
data set allowed us to apply continuous-time hazard rate modelling for the destination-
specic separation rates and thus accounting for unobserved plant heterogeneity by
estimating stratied Cox models. This is of particular importance to account for gender
segregation in the labour market likely to be reected both in observed and unobserved
workplace characteristics. We therefore argue that our results, which are nevertheless
not contradictory to previous ndings, are considerably more reliable. What is more, we
also found that several workplace characteristics, such as the establishment's industrial
relations regime, its workforce composition, and its technological and protability status,
aect workers' separation probabilities dierently by gender and that the coecients
of the catch-all female dummies in both destination-specic hazard rate models lose
signicance once accounting for these gender dierences.
When including the worker's wage as additional regressor, we found that both
separations to employment and nonemployment are signicantly less wage-elastic for
women than for men. This arms previous studies investigating gender dierences in
separation rate wage elasticities, such as Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009), Hirsch et al.
(2010a), as well as Ransom and Oaxaca (2010). By explicitly accounting for unobserved
plant heterogeneity, we even improve on these studies and put their nding on a rmer
21 Again, we have to admit that ideally we would have checked whether gender dierences in separation
rate elasticities and levels are primarily present for married women with children at home as opposed
to childless single women for whom domestic constraints should not play a role. Unfortunately, this
is not possible due to the absence of such information in our data.21
footing. In line with less wage-elastic transition behaviour of women, we found that
separation rates both to employment and nonemployment are considerably lower for
women than for men when controlling for the wage. Given that there exist (unexplained)
gender pay gaps in reality, observed patterns of gender dierences in transition behaviour
seem to reect wage elasticity eects, wage level eects, and eects stemming from
dierences in (other) individual and workplace characteristics of men and women.
Yet, there remains one serious caveat. Regrettably, our data set contains no (reliable)
information on workers' marital status and number of children. Such information would
have allowed us to investigate in more detail whether gender dierences in transition
behaviour are due to family-related reasons and to which extent family policy instruments
may inuence women's separation rates. In spite of this limitation, our analysis has
shed new light on the relevance of individual and workplace characteristics for workers'
transition behaviour. By identifying some gender-specic impacts hitherto neglected we
have shown that women indeed move dierently (and for dierent reasons) than men.22
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of the employment spells
(sample averages)
All Women Men
Female (dummy) .268 1.000 .000
Log daily gross wage 4.518 4.372 4.572
Spell with a censored wage observation in any
of the years 2000{2002 (dummy)
.131 .050 .161
Non-German (dummy) .082 .074 .085
Tenure (number of years) 8.964 8.797 9.025
Age under 21 years (dummy) .007 .011 .006
Age 21{25 years (dummy) .063 .090 .053
Age 26{30 years (dummy) .127 .150 .118
Age 31{35 years (dummy) .183 .169 .189
Age 36{40 years (dummy) .190 .161 .201
Age 41{45 years (dummy) .165 .154 .169
Age 46{50 years (dummy) .145 .150 .143
Age 51{55 years (dummy) .105 .101 .107
Age 56{58 years (dummy) .015 .014 .016
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) .176 .192 .170
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) .656 .641 .662
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) .010 .014 .009
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) .049 .072 .041
Technical college degree (dummy) .049 .030 .055
University degree (dummy) .060 .052 .063
Basic manual occupation (dummy) .239 .153 .271
Qualied manual occupation (dummy) .165 .042 .210
Engineers and technicians (dummy) .112 .044 .137
Basic service occupation (dummy) .092 .052 .106
Qualied service occupation (dummy) .018 .046 .008
Semi-professional (dummy) .055 .132 .027
Professional (dummy) .021 .024 .020
Basic business occupation (dummy) .053 .108 .033
Qualied business occupation (dummy) .219 .383 .159
Manager (dummy) .026 .017 .029
Works council (dummy) .855 .857 .854
Coll. agreement at sect. level (dummy) .741 .728 .746
Coll. agreement at rm level (dummy) .108 .105 .109
Proportion of female workers .347 .522 .284
Proportion of qualied workers .705 .712 .703
Proportion of xed-term workers .063 .069 .061
Bad economic performance (dummy) .221 .191 .232
New production technology (dummy) .734 .738 .732
Establishment size 379.018 386.500 376.279
Regional unemployment rate (lagged, %) 9.195 9.334 9.144
Year 2000 (dummy) .351 .348 .352
Year 2001 (dummy) .325 .322 .327
Year 2002 (dummy) .324 .330 .322
Spells 216,032 57,898 158,134
Separations to employment 38,608 9,309 29,299
Separations to non-employment 23,501 7,121 16,380
Note: The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. Only establishments
with 5{1,000 employees and spells beginning or ending in 2000{2002 are considered.25
Figure A.1: Smoothed Nelson{Aalen baseline hazard after Cox regression of the
workers' instantaneous separation rate to employment
Figure A.2: Smoothed Nelson{Aalen baseline hazard after Cox regression of the
workers' instantaneous separation rate to nonemployment